




*-aware Software for Cyber Physical Systems


John A. Stankovic
BP America Professor

University of Virginia



Theme


- How can we build **practical** cyber physical systems of the future?
- 3 Critical (Foundational) Issues: must be **addressed together**
 - Robustness
 - Real-Time
 - Openness



Foundational Principle

- Scientific and systematic approach for the **impact of the physical on the cyber**
- Propose:
 - Physically-aware SW
 - Validate-aware SW
 - Privacy/security aware SW


*Real-time
aware*




"Open" Smart Living Space

Eavesdrop


Building HVAC






Openness

- Typical embedded systems **closed systems** design not applicable
- Added value
- Systems interact with other systems
- **Evolve** over long time
- Physical system itself changes
- High levels of uncertainty: **Guarantees**




Outline

- Physically-aware software
- Validate-aware software
- Real-Time-aware software
- Privacy-aware software




Physically Aware: Impact of the Physical


- For Wireless Communications (things we know)
 - Noise
 - Bursts
 - Fading
 - Multi-path
 - Location (on ground)
 - Interference
 - Orientation of Antennas
 - Weather
 - Obstacles
 - Energy
 - Node failures



Asymmetry




B, C, and D are the same distance from A.
Note that this pattern **changes over time**.




Routing

- DSR, LAR:
 - Path-Reversal technique




Impact on Path-Reversal Technique



Uncertainties - Voids

Destination

Left Hand Rule
Physically-aware SW






Cyber-Physical Dependencies

- Sensing
 - Sensor properties
 - Target Properties
 - Environmental interference


Energy Efficient Surveillance System

1. An unmanned plane (UAV) deploys motes




3. Sensor network detects vehicles and wakes up the sensor nodes

2. Motes establish a sensor network with power management



Tracking


- Magnetic sensor takes 35 ms to stabilize
 - affects real-time analysis
 - affects sleep/wakeup logic
- Target itself might block messages needed for fusion algorithms
 - Tank blocks messages




Environmental Abstraction Layer (EAL)

Wireless Communication					Sensing and Actuation				
Interference	Burst Losses	Weak Links	Fading	...	Target Properties	Weather	Obstacles	Wake Up Delays	...

*Not HW-SW co-design, but rather **Cyber-Physical co-design***




Validate Aware: Run Time Assurance (RTA)



- Safety Critical
- Long Lived
- Validated
- Re-validated
- Dynamics of Environmental Changes Influence Correctness


See Run Time Assurance paper in IPSN 2010.



RTA Goals


- Validate and Re-validate that system is still **operational (at semantics level)**
- Anticipatory RTA
 - Before problems arise
- Robust to evolutionary changes

Validate-aware software



RTA Solution


- Emulate sensor readings
- Reduce tests to focus on key functionality
- Overlap tests and system operation
- Evolve required tests




Current Solutions


- Prior deployment analysis
 - Testing
 - Debugging
- Post mortem analysis
 - Debugging
- Monitoring low-level components of the system
 - System health monitoring

Necessary, but not sufficient




RTA Framework






Model-based Specification

Sensor Network Event Description Language (SNEDL)





Test Specification

//Declare the basic elements of the language

Time T1;

Region R1, R2;

Event FireEvent;


//Define the elements (time and place)

T1=07:00:00, */1/2010; //first day of month


R1={Room1};


R2={Room2};

FireEvent = Fire @ T1;




Token Flow






Code Generation

- Code is automatically generated from the formal model
- Advantages of the token - flow model:
 - efficiently supports self-testing at run time
 - it is easy to monitor execution states and collect running traces
 - we can easily distinguish between real and test events




Validate-aware SW

- High level spec on "function"
- Runtime SW that targets demonstrating "validation"
- SW design for ease of validation
- Framework - to load, run, display tests
- System: Be aware of validation mode





Real-Time Aware

- Hard deadlines
 - Hard deadlines and safety critical
 - Soft deadlines
 - Time based QoS
-
- Dynamically changing platform (HW and SW)




Example: Group Management (Tracking)







Deadlines

- If we have enough late messages within groups we can lose the track
 - Not straightforward deadline
 - Tied to redundancy, speed of target
- If messages don't make it to base station in **hard** deadline we miss activating "IR camera"
- If we don't act by Deadline D truck carrying bomb explodes - safety critical





Real-Time Scheduling




How robust?

CF=1







Robust RT Scheduling For Real World CPS



How robust?


1.8 CF





Real-Time Technology


- Three possible approaches
 - Velocity Monotonic
 - Exact Characterization
 - SW-based Control Theory




Feedback Control


- Front-End


- feedback loops based on real world control
- generate timing requirements/rates
- generally fixed
- handed to scheduling algorithm






FC-EDF Scheduling






Privacy-aware: Fingerprint And Timing-based Snoop attack




Timestamps	Fingerprints	Locations and Sensor Types
T1		?
T2		?
T3		?
...

V. Srinivasan, J. Stankovic, K. Whitehouse, Protecting Your Daily In-Home Activity Information from a Wireless Snooping Attack, Ubicomp, 2007.




Performance




- 8 homes - different floor plans
 - Each home had 12 to 22 sensors
- 1 week deployments
- 1, 2, 3 person homes
- Violate Privacy - **Techniques Created**
 - 80-95% accuracy of AR via 4 Tier Inference
- **FATS solutions**
 - Reduces accuracy of AR to 0-15%




ADL

- **ADLs inferred:**
 - Sleeping, Home Occupancy
 - Bathroom and Kitchen Visits
 - Bathroom Activities: Showering, Toileting, Washing
 - Kitchen Activities: Cooking
- High level medical information inference possible
- HIPAA requires healthcare providers to protect this information




Timestamps	Fingerprints	Locations and Sensor Types
T1		?
T2		?
T3		?
...



Solutions

- Periodic
- Delay messages
- Add extra cloaking messages
- Eliminate electronic fingerprint
 - Potentiometer
- Etc.

Privacy-aware software



Summary

- Robustness - to deal with uncertainties: (major environment and system evolution)
 - Real-Time - for dynamic and open systems
 - Openness - great value, but difficult

 - Physically-aware
 - Validate-aware
 - Real-Time-aware
 - Privacy/security-aware
- } **aware*
CPS-aware
- Diversity - coverage of assumptions

 - EAL