

Source: [5]

Seeing is Believing: Proximity-based Authentication

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Motivation

- Pairing without user interaction
- Traditional authentication
 - E.g. enter/confirm shared PIN
 - Not possible for certain IoT devices
 - Not scalable
- Use cases
 - NFC payments
 - Keyless entry and start systems
 - Secure pairing for implants
 - ...

Pairing accessory

Make sure that this PIN 141959 matches the PIN that Lumia displays.

ok

cancel

Goal

- A secure and authentic connection between two devices
 - Shared secret
 - Verify authenticity
- Assumption:
Authentic if the devices are within proximity to each other
- Why does proximity lead to trust?
- How to determine proximity?

Why does proximity lead to trust?




Image sources: [9-11]

How to determine proximity?

- Time of Flight
- Radio signal
- RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator)
- Accelerometer
- Illumination
- Audio signals
- ...

Overview

- Wi-Fi Time of Flight, CoNext 2014
- Amigo, UbiComp 2007
- ProxiMate, MobiSys 2011




Image sources: [6-8]


Wi-Fi Time of Flight

- Measure response time

$$t_f = \frac{1}{2} (t_m - t_{ACK} - \delta)$$

- Calculate the distance


$$d = c \cdot t_f$$



Wi-Fi Time of Flight - Challenges


- Noisy measurements
 - Multiple paths
 - Imprecise hardware
- Consequences
 - Measure multiple times
 - Effective median error: 1.7 – 2.4m

Image taken from Marcaletti et al [1]



Wi-Fi Time of Flight - Challenges

- Processing time
 - Keep δ as low as possible
 - What if attacker is faster?
with $\delta = 10.2 \mu s$, up to $\sim 1500 m$ “closer”




Wi-Fi Time of Flight - Conclusion


- + Works with standard Wi-Fi hardware
- Assumes that attacker doesn't have access to faster hardware
- Not suitable for close distance pairing
- Many packets have to be sent

Wi-Fi Time of Flight - Improvement


- Use special hardware to reduce processing time
 - With $\delta_T < 1ns$ an attacker can appear at most $\sim 15\text{ cm}$ closer
- Reflect “instantly”
- Avoid demodulating signal
- Suitable for IoT devices




Amigo



- Radio environment is similar for devices in proximity
- Strategy: Passively observe received signal strength indicator (RSSI) for Wi-Fi packets



(a) Co-located Devices



(b) Devices 10m Apart

Images taken from Varshavsky et al [3]

Amigo – Observation



- Wi-Fi cards are set to promiscuous mode
 - Receive all packets
- Signature of the radio environment
 - Hash of every observed packet
 - RSSI of every observed packet
- RSSI
 - Defined in IEEE 802.11
 - Received power level

Amigo – Authentication

- Establish shared secret
- Observe packets transmitted via Wi-Fi
- Send signature to each other (hash and RSSI)
- Check if the other device made similar observations

Amigo – Results

- Attackers $\geq 3\text{m}$ away can be detected within 5s
- Improve security by hand waving
 - Detect attackers within 1m




Amigo – Conclusion

- + Works with standard Wi-Fi hardware
- + Works reasonably well in close distances
- Paring time depends on Wi-Fi activity
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange is computationally intensive

ProxiMate



- Radio environment is similar for devices in proximity
- Strategy: Observe FM or TV radio signals directly instead of the received signal strength indicator



Images taken from Mathur et al [4]

ProxiMate – Wireless Channel

- Wireless channel
 - State described by complex number
 - Amplitude given by absolute value
 - Phase given by angle
- Features observed by ProxiMate:
 - Amplitude
 - Change of phase
- Use software-defined radio for measurements




Image source: [13]

ProxiMate – FM/TV signal

- Frequency modulated
 - Amplitude constant
 - Amplitude variation not signal dependent
- TV: ~600 MHz
- FM: ~100 MHz





Image source: [12]


ProxiMate – Authentication

- Basic idea: generate a key out of the observed radio environment
 - Alice and Bob observe the environment
 - Alice collects timestamps of observed extrema (L)
 - Alice sends timestamps to Bob
 - Bob collects observed extrema at timestamps L
 - Extremas encode the key:
 - Maximum ... 1
 - Minimum ... 0



ProxiMate – Bit-rate

- Bit-rate limited
 - Wait long enough between two bits such that they are not correlated
- Bit errors occur and have to be corrected
 - Reduced effective bit-rate
- Improve Bit-rate
 - Use multiple radio stations simultaneously



ProxiMate – Results

- Pairing using 10 TV sources:
 - 3.3s at 2.4 cm distance
- Pairing using 10 FM sources:
 - 15s at 16.5 cm distance
- TV: ~600 MHz, ~50 cm wavelength
- FM: ~100 MHz, ~3 m wavelength

ProxiMate – Conclusion

- + Works reasonably fast in close distances
- + Pairing distance can be varied (using different radio channels)
- + Computationally lightweight
- Not yet applicable to todays devices

Conclusion

- Wi-Fi Time of Flight (by Capkun et al.)
 - + Potentially fastest
 - Requires special-purpose hardware
- Amigo
 - + Can be implemented with standard Wi-Fi hardware
 - Requires Wi-Fi communication
- ProxiMate
 - + Computationally cheap
 - Requires more advanced radio interface

References

- [1] MARCALETTI, Andreas, et al. Filtering Noisy 802.11 Time-of-Flight Ranging Measurements. In: *Proceedings of the 10th ACM International Conference on emerging Networking Experiments and Technologies*. ACM, 2014. S. 13-20.
- [2] RASMUSSEN, Kasper Bonne; CAPKUN, Srdjan. Realization of RF Distance Bounding. In: *USENIX Security Symposium*. 2010. S. 389-402.
- [3] VARSHAVSKY, Alex, et al. *Amigo: Proximity-based authentication of mobile devices*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007.
- [4] MATHUR, Suhas, et al. Proximate: proximity-based secure pairing using ambient wireless signals. In: *Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services*. ACM, 2011. S. 211-224.

Thank You

References

- [5] <http://crowdweaver.co.uk/2012/02/11/proximity-marketing-what-is-it/>
- [6] <http://photo.elsear.com/alarm-clocks-and-stopwatch-hot-colorful-images.html>
- [7] <http://www.newgadget.org/mobile-phones/how-to-improve-your-phone-signal/>
- [8] <http://www.naturapark.com.br/site/index.php/administradora/antcoletiva>
- [9] <https://ibtx.wordpress.com/2015/01/06/wearables-time/>
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- [11] <http://how2mediate.com/2010/12/01/is-mediation-a-waste-of-time-2/>
- [12] http://www.hill2dot0.com/wiki/index.php?title=Frequency_modulation
- [13] <http://idmc.info/counter/22/amplitude-and-phase-spectrum-of-sine-wave>